提要：美国政治、经济风向已经转变：一是中期选举后美国政治力量中心已经从布什政府转移到对中国存在根深蒂固反对情绪的参众两院，二是美国住宅市场衰退刚刚开始，并将传播到其它经济领域，导致美国经济处于衰退的边缘。但中国政府似乎对此未给予足够重视，一方面正在精心准备与布什政府的高级代表团的战略对话，另一方面认为经济增长宏观动力转变是长期目标，未给予足够重视。

　　（外脑精华·北京）宏观动力转变是长期目标，中国漠视外部风险

　　由于存在强有力的流动性周期及其催生的金融市场泡沫，全世界对于美国经济增长后劲不足还没有做好准备。虽然中国经济看似不可动摇，但如果美国的变化引发全球经济的转折，中国也难免不受到冲击。

　　2006年即将结束，中国国内的讨论仍然主要局限于其自身面临的挑战。随处可见的繁荣迹象和IPO引领的将要接近2001年初市场高点的股市，让人们跟以往一样保持着热情洋溢的情绪。对于我们提出的调整经济增长驱动因素的想法——将经济增长的动力从出口和投资拉动向私人消费领域的倾斜，中国似乎仅仅是下了一些口头功夫。中国政府认为这种转变是市场化改革的一个长期目标。对于能够看得见的未来，他们认为经济增长宏观动力的变化是渐进的，有充足的时间去适应。

　　美政治风向转变，两院反华情绪根深蒂固

　　我担心更多外部环境的快速变化会令专注于内部事务的中国感到措手不及。有两种来自于美国的可能性是最令人担心。第一种就是美国主导的贸易保护主义风险。中国正在积极准备12月14—15日在北京召开的中美两国政府官员的双边战略会谈。由美国财长鲍尔森、美联储主席伯南克和美国贸易代表施瓦布率领的美国代表团成员包括商务部、劳工部、能源部、美国卫生与公共服务部和环境部的部长。这是我所见过的解决贸易和国际经济问题最高级别的代表团。

　　这次战略对话对于中国来说是件大事，因为长期以来中国一直担心缺少来自国际社会的尊重。然而，这里面有一个重要的问题需要注意：中期选举后，美国的政治力量已经从愿意与中国坐下来谈判的布什政府转移了。中国还没有完全掌握未来政治力量变化的重心以及国会内部参众两院根深蒂固的两党连立的反中国情绪。根据我们的计算，2005年初以来，美国议员先后向国会提交了27项反华贸易提案。到2007年，其中某一项或许就会获得国会的批准，从而成为法律，而这种可能性已经越来越大。就在中国用盛大的仪式欢迎这些“大势已去”的官员并且与他们坐下来谈判时，美国国内的政治气风向已经变了。

　　美经济处衰退边缘，亚洲出口将受影响

　　另一种可能对中国产生外部冲击的就是美国经济的紧急减速。美国是中国最大的出口市场——在过去的五年中占其直接出口的21%。如果加上从香港转口贸易的数据，这个比重会更大。而且，出口几乎占到今年中国GDP的35%以上。这让中国成为当今世界对外依赖程度最高的经济体。然而，在2006年的最后几个月，中国最大的出口市场美国的经济环境正在急剧恶化。

　　这不仅对中国是个大问题，而且对日本、韩国和中国台湾这些亚洲地区其他对外依存度较高的经济体来说，也是个大问题。美国经济增长放缓将对这些地区产生“双重打击”：一方面是向美国的直接出口减少，另一方面是出口到中国然后在“世界工厂”进行组装后再出口到美国的需求也将减少。由于缺少来自国内私人消费领域的支持，以中国为中心的亚洲经济圈很难抵御美国经济的动荡。

　　后一种情况需要进一步分析，因为大多数人对美国经济出现快速而突然的恶化可能持否定意见，在中国、美国和全球其它地方都是这样的。然而，现在美国经济已经显现出经济周期下降过程中的典型迹象。当然，这一切都开始于房地产市场。

　　在过去的几个月中，人们都认为房地产市场已经触底回升。单就这几个月而言，自然总有一个月算是触底。然而，10月份新开工住房的大幅下降，再加上已售出新住宅数量的下调和未售出住宅数量的大幅飙升，让那些以为市场已经触底的人大跌眼镜。房地产市场的启动一定是与住宅建设有关，即新开工项目的启动在先。而市场重新启动前一定是先触底，尽管目前可能市场还没有到触底的阶段。接下来就是新开工项目减少所带来的滞后效应，包括建筑业及其就业、建筑业雇员收入、家具和电器需求、房地产经纪以及食品产业的低迷。不过，即使新开工住宅已经探底，美国住宅建设的衰退才刚刚开始。

　　此外，房地产引导的衰退很快会传播到美国经济的其它领域。9月和10月连续两个月的零售额和工业产出的下降不应该被轻视。

　　人们认为，美国消费者总具备很强的适应力，他们的支出即将走出低迷。然而，11月消费者信心指数再次下降、失业保险申请正在增加。而根据最新数据，今年3季度的个人收入数字下调了近1000亿美元。这些动向令上述乐观的看法不攻自破。但是真正的转折是资本支出报告：10月份预期订购和货物发送计划都大幅下降。资本支出长久以来被认为是伟大的“交接棒”，能够有效的弥补房地产或者（亦可能是同时）消费领域的低迷。最近的数据显示这个公认的交接棒已经落地。其实这并不奇怪，因为资本支出一直以来就是一种“衍生需求”，它本身对资本使用的未来压力的预期高度敏感。由于房地产和消费领域的前景极为动荡，所谓的商业投资支出这个加速器也迅速通过10月份的资本货物数据引起了人们的注意。

　　所有的这一切：房地产、消费、资本支出再加上3季度库存数据的调高，显示出美国经济可能处于五年来第二次泡沫后衰退的边缘。在各类主要资产市场中，只有债市和汇市已经意识到了这种可能性，因为债券价格攀升、美元疲软。其他市场，尤其是股市和利差类金融产品市场，还完全没有反映出这种风险。一旦这些市场意识到风险，将产生令人忧虑的影响。

　　经济增长依赖出口平台，中国尚未为美风向转变做好准备

　　所有这一切都距离忙碌中的中国非常遥远。中国的经济增长使人印象深刻，以致于大家都认为繁荣是理所当然的。中国也已经从长久的自我怀疑转变为信心十足。自信并没有错，它对于任何成功的经济发展战略都是一个关键要素。但是自信必须是建立在坚实的基础上，才能为经济的持续增长加速。由于国内私人消费难以起到支撑作用，因此中国的信心越来越依赖出口的强大带动力和与此相关的投资高增长，而这二者都与中国出口生产平台的不断扩张密切相关。这就会造成一种危险局面：如果以美国为中心的保护主义浪潮升级，或美国经济急剧恶化，从而冲击到中国经济增长的狭小基础，后果将会怎样？

　　中国并没有为两种情况的任何一种做好准备，世界上其他国家恐怕也是如此。

　　英文原文：Unprepared in Beijing
Taking its cue from a powerful liquidity cycle and the frothy financial market conditions it has inspired, the world is not prepared for a meaningful shortfall of US economic growth. That's certainly the message I take away from my final stop of the year in China -- whose seemingly Teflon-like economy would hardly be immune to a global accident made in America.

As 2006 draws to a close, the debate inside of China remains quite focused on its own internal challenges. At least, that's the tentative impression that emerges from the first two days of a three-day swing through Beijing. With visible signs of the boom literally everywhere you turn and an IPO-led stock market surging its way back toward the highs of early 2001, the mood remains as ebullient as ever. While the latest monthly data are flashing signs of a slowdown, you would never know that in meeting with key decision-makers in Beijing. The Chinese seem to be paying lip-service to the rebalancing imperatives that I and other macro types continue to stress -- the long-awaited shift from an export- and investment-led growth model to one that draws increasingly greater support from private consumption （see my just released Special Economic Study, “China’s Rebalancing Imperatives: A Giant Step for Globalization,” December 1, 2006）. Senior Chinese officials frame such a transformation as a longer-term objective of market-driven reforms. For the foreseeable future, however, they believe they have the luxury of time to cope with what they believe to be an evolutionary shift in the macro sources of economic growth.

I fear an inward-looking China could be blindsided by more rapidly changing external developments. Two such possibilities worry me the most, and they are both made in America. First, is the risk of Washington-led trade protectionism. Understandably, China is focused on the upcoming strategic bilateral talks between top US and Chinese officials slated for Beijing in two weeks time （December 14-15）. Led by Treasury Secretary Paulson, Fed Chairman Bernanke and US Trade Representative Schwab, and accompanied by Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Environment, this is as high-level a US delegation as I have seen that is traveling to deal with a major trade and international economic issue. This strategic economic dialog is a very big deal in official China, where the lack of respect from the international community has long been a source of considerable concern. Yet there's one key problem with the emphasis that China is placing on this mission: In a post-election climate, US political power has shifted away from the Bush Administration officials who will be sitting at the table with their Chinese counterparts. China doesn't fully grasp the significance of the coming political power change and the deeply-rooted bipartisan anti-China sentiment that pervades both houses of the US Congress. By our count, fully 27 pieces of anti-China trade legislation have been introduced in the Congress since early 2005. The odds are rising that one of them will become law in 2007. The political winds have shifted in America just as China sits down with great ceremony to negotiate with the "lame ducks."

A second possibility that could provide an external shock to China would be a sharp slowdown in the US economy. America is China's largest export market -- directly accounting for 21% of its total exports over the past five years and a good deal more than that if re-exports from Hong Kong are added back in. Moreover, exports are likely to exceed 35% of Chinese GDP this year -- making it, by far, the most externally dependent major economy in the world today. Yet economic conditions in China's largest export market -- the United States -- are deteriorating dramatically in the final months of 2006. This is a big deal not only for China but for other externally-dependent economies elsewhere in Asia -- especially the big ones like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. These latter economies could well be hit with a "double whammy" in the event of a shortfall in US economic growth -- a reduction in their direct exports to America and a cutback in the demand for components they send to China that are then assembled in the "world's factory" on their way to the US. Lacking in support from domestic private consumption, a China-centric Asian economy is an unlikely candidate for decoupling in the event of a US growth accident.

It's worth belaboring this latter possibility -- only because most remain in denial over the swift and sudden deterioration in the US economy. That's true in China, as well as in the United States and elsewhere around the world. Yet there are now signs of cumulative weakness in the US economy that have all the classic manifestations of a looming cyclical downturn. It all started, of course, in the housing market -- the sector where everyone has been calling the bottom over the past few months. One of these months that call will certainly be correct. However, October's outsize decline in housing starts, together with downwardly-revised readings of new home sales and still sharply elevated backlogs of unsold dwellings, pose serious problems for the bottom-fishers. Keep in mind that any call on housing starts pertains to the leading edge of homebuilding activity -- the initiation of a new building project. Starts always bottom first -- even though they may not have done so yet. What comes next -- and this is the key for the macro economy -- are the lagged impacts from a fallback in newly started units that then depress subsequent trends in construction, employment in the building sector, the income generation forthcoming from such activity, the furniture and appliances that go into new homes, real estate brokers, and so on down the feed chain. Don't kid yourself, even if housing starts have finally bottomed, there's plenty to come in America's nascent recession in the residential construction sector.

Meanwhile, in contrast to what you hear from the "compartmentalists," the housing-led deterioration is rapidly spreading to other sectors of the US economy. Two consecutive monthly declines for both retail sales and manufacturing output in September and October should hardly be taken lightly -- to say nothing of mixed early reports by retailers for November. A renewed decline in consumer confidence in November, rising unemployment insurance claims, and a stunning downward revision of nearly $100 billion to personal income （mainly wage earnings） in 3Q06, belies the notion that ever-resilient American consumers are poised to come out of this swoon. But the real kicker was a perfectly awful report on capital spending activity -- with forward-looking orders and backward-looking shipments both sagging sharply in October. Capex has long been billed as the recipient of the great "baton pass" -- the sector that would seamlessly pick up the slack in the event of a downturn in housing and/ or consumption. The latest data suggest the proverbial baton may have been dropped -- hardly surprising, in my view, since capital spending has long behaved as a "derived demand" that is highly sensitive to expectations of future pressures on capacity utilization. With the housing and consumption outlooks shaky at best, the so-called accelerator models of business capital spending are flashing precisely the type of caution that the October data on capital goods conveyed.

Adding it all up -- housing, consumption, capex, together with an upward revision to 3Q06 inventory building -- and the US economy may be on the brink of its second post-bubble recession in five years. A surging bond market and a weaker dollar appear to be alone among major asset classes in figuring this out. I continue to fear the implications of that realization for other markets -- especially equities and spread products, which remain priced for the veritable absence of any risk.

All this is a long way away from the hustle and bustle of Beijing. China's performance has been so impressive for so long that I sense a growing tendency to take the boom for granted. Reflecting this belief, I am starting to detect an important shift in the Chinese mood, with long-entrenched feelings of self-doubt now giving way to a new-found confidence. There's nothing wrong with confidence -- it can be a critical element of any successful economic development strategy. But confidence must be on solid ground to fuel sustainable growth. Lacking in support from internal private consumption, the Chinese confidence factor is increasingly dependent on a powerful export-led growth dynamic and associated gains in fixed investment -- both very much tied to the open-ended expansion of China's outward-looking export production platform. This could turn into a surprisingly precarious situation. What happens if the narrow underpinnings of China's growth strategy are undermined by the twin surprises of Washington-led protectionism and a sudden deterioration in the US economy? Beijing is unprepared for either of those possibilities -- as is, I'm afraid, the rest of the world.


来源：摩根斯坦利，2006.12.1，作者：Stephen S. Roach

信息来源：中国经济网